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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellant and Respondent are not, nor have they ever been, married to each other.
The Appellant and Respondent have two minor children in common, specifically, Zebadiah
Evans, whose date of birth is

and Videaliah Evans, whose date of birth is

Appellant and Respondent's original child custody order was entered April 8, 2008, wherein they
shared joint legal and physical custody, with an alternating week on, week off parenting
schedule. On December 23, 2009 Appellant and Respondent entered into a stipulated child
custody and support agreement, due to Appellant's enrollment in college. The December 23,
2009 Stipulation Agreement granted Respondent primary physical custody of the minor children
during the school year, and Appellant primary physical custody in the summer months. The
Stipulation Agreement was formed solely due to Appellant's unavailability while attending
college classes. On January 5,2010, pursuant to the December 23,2009 Stipulation Agreement,
the Magistrate court entered its Order re: Child Custody and Support.

Due to unforeseen

circumstances, Appellant did not enroll in school. Subsequent to the January 5, 2010 order,
Respondent served the retained jurisdiction program for a felony DUI (his fourth or

lifetime

DUI), and was placed on four years' supervised probation. While the Respondent was senring
the Retained Jurisdiction, the Appellant moved to Newman Lake, Washington, closer to her
. Appellant, on May 3,

10, filed a motion to modify the January 5, 2010 Order

to

a

substantial, material and permanent change in circumsta.'1ces, and requesting primary,
custody. The motion to
Custody, entered October 5, 201

proceeded to trial on October 5,2010; and
the Magistrate Court found that Appellant failed to

1

a

substantial, material and permanent change in circumstances in order to justify a modification of
January 5, 2010 custody order, and dismissed the case. Pursuant to LA.R. 12.2, Appellant
appeals the Magistrate Court's decision and now submits the following Reply Brief in support of
her original argument.

II.

ISSlJE PRESENTED

1. Did the lower court abuse its discretion in dismissing the motion to modify by finding
that Appellant failed to establish a material and substantial change in circumstances?
ANSWER: YES

III.

LA W AND ARGUMENT

A. Standard of Review
In awarding custody, the welfare and best interests of children are of paramount
importance, and the court is required to provide for them as it deems necessary or proper to
achieve this end. LC.§32-717; Schmitt v. Schmitt, 83 Idaho 300, 305, 362 P.2d 884,887 (1961).
Once a custodial order is entered, the party seeking to modify it must first demonstrate that a
material and substantial change of circumstances has occurred since the entry of
custodial order. Osteraas v.
exercise of discretion
as one

Idaho 350, 859 P.2d 948 (1993). Wilen reviewing an

Court

discretion; (2) whether the

lower cou..'i rightly perceived the issue
court acted within the boundaries

2

such discretio:1

and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the
court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.

its judgment and discretion for that of

[The Supreme] Court will not attempt to
the trial court except in cases where the record

'-'d'-~""'CJ

a clear abuse of discretion. Levin v.

Levin, 122 Idaho 583, 836 p.2d 529 (1992); Biggers v Biggers, 103 Idaho 550, 650 P.2d 692

(1982). An abuse of discretion occurs where there is insufficient evidence to support the court's
finding regarding the best interest of the child. Roeh v. Roeh, 113 Idaho 557, 746 P.2d 1016
(1987).

A trial court's finding of fact will be upheld if there is substantial and competent

evidence supporting them. Schultz v. Schultz, 145 Idaho 859, p.3d 1234 (2008).

The party

seeking modification has the burden of justifying a change in custody, and although the threshold
question is whether a [material] and substantial change in the circumstances has occurred, the
paramount concern is the best interest of the child. Biggers, 103 Idaho 550, 650 P.2d 692; Cope
v. Cope) 98 Idaho 920, 576 P.2d 201 (1978).

B. Appellant can establish that the Magistrate Court abused its discretion in
concluding that Appellant failed to make a sufficient showing that there was a
material and substantial change in circumstances.

response to Appellant's original brief, Respondent argues that the Magistrate Judge did
not

her discretion in finding that Appellant failed to show a substantial and material
circumstances. In support

this

Respondent states that the substantial and

change in circumstances cited in Appellant's May 3,2010 Iv10tion to Modify an Order
or Decree was "Father is incarcerated at the North Idaho Correctional Institution in Cottonwood,
VoU, p.4S). This fact is uncontested. Appellant's argument and the decision ofthe
court regarding a material and substantial change of circumstances were not based on
Respondent's incarceration status. At the August 17,

10 Motion and Scheduling Conference

Magistrate Judge, of her own initiative, brought to the attention of the parties the more
change in circumstances; the fact that Appellant will no longer be attending school.
Tr. Vol. 1, p.9, L. 20. A court is not confined by the allegations of the petition to modify in

seeking out what custody arrangement would be in the best interest of the child. McGriff v.
.McGriff, 140 Idaho 642, 99 P.3d III (2004). Appellant's argument and the decision of the

Iv1agistrate Judge in the October 5, 2010 Court Trial was based on Appellant's changed student
status. Respondent's incarceration status was not addressed relative to a material and substantial
change in circumstances. This alteration follows from the Magistrate Court's findings on August
17,2010. Accordingly, the controlling question in [aJ case where the judge made findings as to
best interests of the children largely outside of those changes originally alleged ... is whether
evidence supports the findings made by the magistrate as to a change of circumstances and
the best interests of the children were served by considering a modification of the
arrangement." M~cGriff, 140 Idaho 642, (2004).

In support of his
Requests for Admissions:

4

Admission 1: Please admit that you decided not to

Request

to school because

this case;

Request for Admission 2: Please admit that you intend to enroll/and or attend school
when this case is completed;

Request for Admission 3: Please admit that you moved out of the state ofIdaho in
reliance on the Stipulation in this case.

Through naivety and not neglect, in her Pro-Se representation, Appellant failed to
respond to Respondent's Request for Admissions.

Pursuant to LR.C.P § 36, Request for

Admission 1 and Request for Admission 2 were deemed admitted by the Court. Request for
Admission 3 was not addressed by the court, and is immaterial to this case. Regardless of the
above, the Magistrate Judge's decision that Appellant failed to make a sufficient finding that
there was a material change in circumstance between the January 5, 2010 Order and Appellant's
May 3, 2010 Motion to Modify an Order or Decree was not based on

above admissions. The

Magistrate's decision was based on her conclusion that Appellant's securement of full-time
place of attending school did not constitute sufficient significance to justify a
order.

Tr.

II, p.24,

5

8.

Respondent's Requests for Admission are not relevant to the decision

Magistrate.

\Vhat is relevant

is that the Magistrate's October 5, 2010 decision directly contradicted

her prior statement in

August 17, 2010 Motions and Scheduling Conference whereupon the

understanding that Appellant would no longer be attending school, The :Magistrate Judge stated
change in circumstances." Tr. Vol. 1, p.9, L.2o. Reemphasizing

"Well, that's a fairly

Appellant's original argument; The Magistrate Court cannot dismiss Appellant's Motion to
Modify the January 5,

10 Custody Order upon a finding of no substantial and material change

in circumstances, when she previously found that there was a substantial and material change in
circumstances. For this reason, and the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully requested of this
Honorable Court that this case be reversed and remanded to the lower court for a finding
consistent with the above facts.

C.

Appellant can establish that the Magistrate Court abused its
discretion as there is insufficient evidence to support the Magistrate Court's
finding regarding the best interest of the children.

The

Court failed to make a finding in the best interest of the children.

Respondent concedes this fact, however argues; that because the Magistrate Judge did not find
that there was a material, substantial and permanent change of circumstances that the Magistrate
was not required to consider the best interests of the children. Respondent's
in both logic a.'1d
to

IS

vvrong

. Authorities indicate that such a change in CirCU1TIstances is a

custody award modification. By example;

6

v. Levin, 122 Idaho 583, 836 P.2d 529

(1

However; the effect of a change in circumstances on the minor children involved is a

significant factor in determining whether such change constitutes a material, substantial
permanent change of circumstances. As such, any change in circumstances must consider
best interest of the children. In Posey v. Bunney, 98 Idaho 258, 561 P.2d 400 (1977) the court
carefully analyzed these two rules of law and placed them in proper perspective. Quoting from
Posey as follows:

material, permanent and substantial change standard is a sound legal
"While
principle, care must be exercised in its application. The tendency is to search for some
greatly altered circumstance in an attempt to pinpoint the change called for by the rule.
Thus, the emphasis is placed on defining some change, and making that change appear,
in itself, to be material, permanent and substantial. This focus is misleading. The

important portion of the standard is that which relates the change in conditions to the best
interest of the child [emphasis addedJ. The changed circumstance standard was
designed, as a matter of policy, to prevent continuous re-litigation of custody matters.
That policy goal, however, is of secondary importance when compared to the best
interest of the child, which is the controlling consideration in all custody proceedings
[emphasis added]. The court must look not only for changes of condition or
circumstance which are material, permanent and substantial, but also must thoroughly

explore the ramifications, vis a vis the best interest of the child, of any change which is
evident. What may appear by itself to be a small and insignificant change in
circumstances may have significant effects insofar as children are concerned [emphasis
added]." Posey v. Bunney, 98 Idaho 258 (1977).

The Magistrate Judge in the August 17,2010 Motions and Scheduling Conference stated that
Appellant's changed enrollment status was a "fairly significant change in circumstances." Tr.
Vol. 1, p.9, L.20.

In the October 5, 2010 Court Trial, The Magistrate Judge holding

contrary stated " ... the

to

change is that you're not going to school and you're working full
the broad discrepancy in the Magistrate Judge's

evaluation of Appellant's

VH1.Hvl.ll

statu.s, such enrollment status indicates a.n evident change
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in circumstances. "The Court must look not only for changes of condition or circumstance
[the court] also must thoroughly explore the

which are material, permanent and substfu"1tial,

ramifications, vis a vis the best interest of the child, of any change which is evident. What may
appear by itself to be a small and insignificant change in circumstances may have significant
effects insofar as children are concerned [emphasis added]." Posey v. Bunney, 98 Idaho 258

(1977). The fact that Appellant will no longer be attending classes is a material and substantial
change of circumstances.

The effect of Appellant not attending classes is a material and

substantial change of circumstances.

The Supreme Court will not attempt to substitute its judgment and discretion for that of the
[lower] court in resolving whether to modify child custody, except in cases where the record
reflects a clear abuse of discretion, which occurs where there is insufficient evidence to support
trial court's finding regarding the best interests of the child [emphasis added]. Brownson v.
Allen, 134 Idaho 60, 995 P.2d 830 (2000).

vVhen reviewing an exercise of discretion the

Supreme Court inquires: (1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of
discretion, (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and
consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices, and (3) whether the court
reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Brownson, 134 Idaho 60 (2000).

In our present case, it is

that

standard in its modification of

Magistrate
evaluation.

8

to apply

best

A court must consider the best

interest of the minor child[ren] when making
[among other factors] consider:
... and

determinations, and when analyzing this

... The character and circumstances of all individuals

need to promote continuity and stability in the life of the child. LC.§32-

717(1). As a result of the Magistrate Court's failure to apply the best interest standard the above
1''0'''1.,.-',""0

were not taken under consideration,

As

date, and as

the October 5,

o Order re:

Child Custody, Respondent is

on supervised felony probation for four years following his Retained Jurisdiction Program for a
Felony DUI; that conviction being his fourth or fifth lifetime DUt Respondent has a history of
"very heavy drinking", as emphasized by the Honorable Judge Heise. Tr. Vol. 11, p.25, L.4. If
Respondent violates his probation, he is facing a term of imprisonment in the State Penitentiary.
Although Respondent is working to reform his behavior, there is still a significant risk of relapse
that should not be minimized. Respondent has an alarming history of alcohol abuse. This pattern
in Respondent's life is a significant factor and creates vulnerability in his ability to promote
continuity and stability with the parties' minor children.

The following exchange between The Magistrate Court, Respondent's Attorney, a.'1d
Appellant took place during the October 5, 2010 Court Trial:

The Court: Why was Mr. Evans the pen?
Mr. Featherston: It was for a felony
Appellant: His fourth or
Mr. Featherston: He did a rider and is on

9

at

I

Court: I don't ... I don't know ifI was thinking clearly when I gave ... you know
it was agreed to in January, 2010." Tr. Vol. II,p.19, L. 3-13.

not spelled out word for word in the October 5,
apparent that the Magistrate Judge significantly questioned

o Court

Trial Transcript, it is

custody in Respondent as a

result of his criminal history. The fact that Appellant will no longer be attending school, is in a
stable and healthy home environment, will be working full time and is available during non-work
to provide for the care of her children establishes a custody option that better facilitates the
best interest of the children. To disregard this fact is to disregard reason

Four times Respondent cites to Reed v. Reed, 137 Idaho 53, 44 P.3d 1108 (2002) stating: "A
magistrate's findings of fact, however, will be upheld if they are supported by substantial and
competent evidence and not clearly erroneous." Reed, 137 Idaho 53 (2002). The Magistrate
Court failed to support its findings with substantial and competent evidence. The Magistrate
Court did not reach its' decision by an exercise of reason. There is no evidence to support the
Magistrate Court's finding regarding the best interests of the children. The best interest standard
was not even applied. For the reasons state herein, the Magistrate's finding is clearly erroneous.
It is respectfully requested of

Honorable Court that the Magistrate Court's decision be

reversed and remanded to the lower court for a finding consistent

10

the above facts.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Substantial and material changes have occurred since the entry of
Order re:

January 5, 2010

Custody and Support. Specifically, Appellant will not be attending college.

This change was recognized and identified by the Magistrate Judge at the August 17,2010
Motions and Scheduling Conference as a "significant change in circumstances." Tr. Vol 1,
p.9, L.20. Appellant's non-student status significantly changes Appellant's capacity to care

for her children. More importantly, this change makes the custody order currently in place
no longer in the best interest of the children. [The Court] "must thoroughly explore the
ramifications, vis a vis the best interest of the child, of any change which is evident." Posey,
98 Idaho 258 (1977). The recognition of an evident change prompts the duty to consider the
best interests of the children. Only upon consideration of the effect of an evident change on
the parties minor children (i.e., consideration of the children's best interest) can a
determination of whether a material, substantial and permanent change exists be rationally
made. For

reasons stated herein and at length above, it is respectfully requested of this

Honorable Court that the Magistrate Court's decision be reversed and remanded to the lower
court for a finding consistent with the above facts.

11

Respectfully submitted this

day of April, 2011.

John
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ~ day of April, 2011 a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document was served by the method indicated below and addressed to the following.
Jeremy Featherston
Featherston Law Chtd.
113 S. Second Ave
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864

Facsimile 208.263.0400
X U.S. Mail

